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Large-scale mining of low-grade ores is energy-intensive and generates vast wastes. It has limited suitability for
production of specialist metals that are required in relatively small quantities. An approach that limits en-
vironmental impact by restricting mining to high-grade deposits requires the investigation of small ore deposits
as alternative sources of metals. The return on investment from small deposits is incompatible with the expensive
surveys needed to secure investment and the high costs of managing risk. But increasing energy and transport
costs may create space in the market for small-deposit mining with highly-competitive technological solutions. It
can be argued that small-deposit mining is ethical because it must involve cooperation between mining com-
panies and local residents who share a collective expectation and responsibility for their quality of life. However,
small-deposit mining tends to be a limited, short-term initiative, which requires consideration of the extended
‘afterlife’ of mines. This manuscript is the culmination of five years of cross-sector dialogue and stakeholder
engagement activities. It debates what constitutes a small deposit and describes the interactions between mining
and manufacturing, investment, environment and society. It reaches the conclusion that technological innova-
tions will support the re-emergence of small deposit mining as an important part of a diverse raw materials
production sector. We do not suggest a return to past approaches, to mining of small, high-grade deposits, but a
consideration of alternative narratives of localised, community-orientated mining processes, thus giving social,
economic and environmental context to the needs of the present day.
1. Introduction
The prices of major metals are closely linked to economic cycles.
Thus, declining production is linked to falling demand rather than to
the declining availability of geological resources (Graedel et al., 2014).
The resulting scarcity of feedstocks drives prices upwards. This en-
courages investment and research into substitution, recycling, ex-
ploration and production technologies. Improved recycling methods
have led to increased secondary supplies of metals. However, the re-
lative contribution of recycled materials to feedstock supplies within
circular economy framings, particularly of minor metals used for
modern technologies, are limited. There are multiple underlying rea-
sons: incremental losses of metals throughout the manufacturing chain;
a lack of economically-competitive sorting and recycling technologies;
limited availability of end products to recycle; and global demand for
end products is growing faster than the contribution from recycling
(Fig. 1) (Oberle et al., 2019; Steinbach and Wellmer, 2010). Demand for
primary raw materials therefore continues to increase. Fig. 2 shows
annual global production of multiple metals from 1970 to 2015, for 10
commodities. Iron is mined in quantities that are two orders of mag-
nitude greater than copper, aluminium, lead and zinc. Each of these
bulk metals are in turn produced in volumes that are two orders of
magnitude greater than antimony, tungsten, Rare Earth Oxides (REO),
cobalt and bismuth. With the exception of bismuth, the rate of primary
production for all commodities is accelerating. (The data for bismuth
includes primary production, i.e. Núi Pháo mine in Vietnam, and the
by-product of tungsten and lead mining, primarily from China). Fluc-
tuations in demand and supply affect the metals that are produced in
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Fig. 1. Idealised growth curve (after Steinbach and
Wellmer, 2010), illustrating the limitations of recycling and
material substitution to reduce criticality of raw material
supply. Growing consumption at time A means that the sec-
ondary material available at a later date cannot meet demand.
During times of constant consumption, the amount of sec-
ondary material available at the end of a product lifetime is
equivalent to that at the start of lifetime of the product. This
theoretical equivalence supposes 100% manufacturing effi-
ciency and 100% recycling rate. The contribution of recycling
to overall consumption is therefore limited by the demand
growth rate and the lifetime of technological products. The
lower curve shows the potential effect of successful material
substitution in one technology (2) on the overall demand for a
commodity. Reduced demand can be supplied by a more
limited number of suppliers or mines and increase the risks to
supply in the case of disruptions in the supply region. This
could increase the risk of supply problems for remaining
technologies (1).
Fig. 2. Global production, in terms of million tonnes of metal content, between 1970 and 2015. Data is from the World Mineral Statistics dataset, provided and
maintained by the British Geological Survey. (*Data includes primary and by-product production.).
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lower quantities (e.g. antimony) far more significantly than the bulk
metals that are produced in the largest quantities.
The manufacturing chain from feedstock supply, to intermediate
product manufacturing, and to end-product manufacturing, embodies
an incremental increase in value as materials are traded many times
(Korinek, 2019) and requires that feedstocks are relatively inexpensive.
While the manufacturers and raw materials producers are inextricably
linked by supply and demand, the impact of price fluctuations on
business is proportionally greater for raw materials producers than for
manufacturers, since it relates to a larger proportion of their overall
micro-economic model. The production of large quantities of bulk
metals at low cost relative to the rest of the value chain, requires that
world-class mines run at high efficiency using economies of scale
(Humphreys, 2013). The need to maximise throughput (tonnes/hour or
tph) from large mines (both super pits and block caves) has driven past
innovations in mining practice to reduce operating costs (€/h) with
resulting low specific production costs (€/t Run of Mine or ROM). A
decreasing cost per unit output with increased mine size favours the
development of giant or ‘world-class’ deposits (Laznicka, 1999) with
proven reserves that ensure an extended life of mine and an adequate
return on investment. It frequently takes decades from initial discovery
of an ore deposit through evidencing success to investors and to full-
scale production (Rademeyer et al., 2020). To prove the economic
viability of a deposit is a complex, expensive and protracted process,
requiring adherence to reporting standards that recognise the interplay
of geology, viable processing methods, and issues of access and supply
infrastructures (energy, water, etc.). It is another protracted process to
gain licencing in a favourable economic, legislative and societal cli-
mate. The overall scale of mining operations and the established re-
porting and finance system mean that the raw materials sector does
respond to demand, albeit slowly, for the bulk metals required for in-
frastructural development and transport.
We consider how the reporting and finance systems that were de-
signed for large-scale mining for bulk metals are applied to metals that
are produced in smaller quantities (Fig. 2), including the metals de-
scribed as critical. We adopt a definition of Critical Metals as follows. 1,
they are the wide range of metals with specialist chemical and physical
properties that are used in small quantities in the manufacture of low-
carbon and emerging modern technologies. 2, they are the metals that
are produced by a small number of countries, frequently with political
and social infrastructures that create a substantial supply risk
(EC, 2017;2014; Moss et al., 2011). We do not focus on those Critical
Raw Materials that are biotic or produced as by-products at refineries.
Where smaller demand can be accommodated at just a few mines
globally, the rate of response of supply to demand has potentially
greater impact on the value chain. There is the potential to mitigate
supply shortages by substituting alternative materials. But the specialist
properties of technology metals mean that some substitutions may re-
sult in the end product losing functionality. Furthermore, a decrease in
demand for a metal that is already produced in relatively small quan-
tities (Fig. 1) has the potential to create a feedback loop of increasing
business risk amongst the producers of raw materials and increasing
supply risk for the end-users in the value chain.
The underlying concepts behind this work are the significant con-
tribution of historical contextualisation to scientific interpretation, and
the use of historical and contemporary narratives as data in scientific
methodologies or modelling to develop innovative paradigms
(Büthe, 2002; Cleland, 2001; Mayr, 2000). The work is the culmination
of five years of stakeholder engagement and public participation ac-
tivities across a wide-range of sectors and groups, including resource
extraction and minerals processing, engineering and manufacturing,
social sciences and ethics, and post-mining communities. Based on this
evidence, we discuss the trends that are likely to influence future de-
mand and production – from industrial, economic, geo-historical and
environmental standpoints – and examine whether the current para-
digm of mining world-class deposits is appropriate for the extraction of
critical and technology metals. We consider whether economies of scale
can or should ethically be applied in the context of an abbreviated life
of mine in small deposits. We further ask whether a change in the
pattern of mining to suit the extraction of technology metals from small
deposits is a new innovation, or whether it is an evolution of an ancient
and established history of mining that embodies innovation and adap-
tation. We support our enquiry using case studies as an exploratory
tool, with the intention of informing the development of subsequent
research methodologies (Rowley, 2000; Yin, 2014). We retain the use of
the term ‘small deposit’ mining throughout the manuscript as far as
possible and retain the use of the term ‘scale’ to emphasise the spatial
and environmental footprint of mining operations, to negate challenges
arising in the dialogues around artisanal mining contexts as addressed
by Sidorenko et al., (2020). We note that small-scale mining is suitable
for, but not limited to, mining of small deposits.
2. Criticality And the value chain
Supply security assessments have been successful at identifying
which minerals are most exposed to supply constraints in the near fu-
ture (EC, 2017, 2014; Glöser et al., 2015; Nassar et al., 2020). However,
these studies have also been subject to criticism, as different authors
have questioned their ability to translate their findings into the devel-
opment and application of tangible strategies to ensure a secure mineral
supply within the context of the value chain. As early as 2011, Buijs and
Sievers (2011) stated that assessments “lack predictive power beyond the
short term; tend to overstate the economic impact of a possible supply dis-
ruption of ‘critical’ minerals; fail to distinguish between short-term and long-
term problems; fail to take into account the diversity and particular char-
acteristics of the resource markets analysed; and focus exclusively on risks
related to the mining and export of raw materials, but disregard the larger
production chain (e.g. refining, transport, and trade in semi-products)”.
Since that time, a great deal of research has created a deeper under-
standing of the issues surrounding material criticality, as a function of
commodity trading in international value chains. Renner and
Wellmer (2019) explain that metals are traded in a buyer's market,
where the buyer is able to apply pressure to lower prices in an over-
supplied market. This particularly applies to major metals. Amongst the
minor metals are the critical metals, defined using criteria that include
geographical supply concentration. Analysis by Renner and
Wellmer (2019) suggests that this causes supply shocks and price vo-
latility only in a context of regional or national conflict. The authors
contend that the reaction to perceived supply shocks on the demand
side, or hype, has a far greater impact on price volatility than supply
concentration. Frenzel et al., (2017) concur that, due to flaws in criti-
cality assessments, many of the raw materials generally identified as
critical are probably not critical. But they state that the issue of supply
security remains significant for some sectors, and surveys of criticality
continue to identify the materials that are at greatest risk of supply
shortage (Hayes and McCullough, 2018; Nassar et al., 2020). Ex-
ceptionally, the Covid-19 pandemic has also created enormous short-
term uncertainty. Unusually, falling demand for mined products (as
economic activity slows down) now coincides with supply-side up-
heaval (Steen, 2020). Increased risks of supply shocks may ensue. While
price volatility is greater for minor metals than for major metals
(Renner and Wellmer, 2019), the European Commission emphasises
that ‘all raw materials, even when not critical, are important for the EU
economy’ (EC, 2014).
The European Commission has formulated responses that straddle
the value chain and promote more research to optimize supply, recycle
materials and to substitute metals in manufacturing processes in a cir-
cular economy (EC, 2018). The aim of the circular economy being to
maintain the value of products, materials and resources in the economy
for as long as possible, to minimize the generation of waste (EC, 2015)
and to reduce future consumption (Oberle et al., 2019). Fig. 3 depicts
the 27 materials that are currently classified as critical by the European
K.R. Moore, et al. Resources, Conservation & Recycling: X 7 (2020) 100040
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Commission in terms of economic importance and supply risk
(EC, 2017). In a background report to the European Commission,
Mathieux et al., (2017) examined the sector-specific importance of the
critical raw materials, which were linked to all supply chain stages
across eight industrial sectors including the automotive and renewable
energy sectors. The energy transition required to satisfy climate policies
with net zero emissions is inextricably linked to critical metal and semi-
metal production (Bazilian, 2018; Frenzel et al., 2017; Giurco et al.,
2010; Tokimatsu et al., 2017) by the specific properties required for
functionality in technological devices and renewable energy infra-
structure. The need for technology metals, whether critical or with little
risk of disruption to supply, at the global energy-mineral nexus is
concomitant with bulk metal production due to the total materials re-
quirements of energy infrastructure (e.g. Martinez et al., 2009). The
potential for supply - demand imbalances during and following the
Covid-19 pandemic will increase if the energy industry (Watts and
Ambrose, 2020) accelerates its transition to a low-carbon economy. The
energy transition, and indeed the current level of technological in-
novation, require a greater diversity of materials than at any time
previously. Critical raw materials are geological available
(Graedel et al., 2014) but any long-term forecast is due to enormous
uncertainly in terms of trade relations and emerging economies, tech-
nological innovation or environmental limits (Buchholz et al., 2019;
Humphreys, 2019a, 2019b).
There is a pressing need for new perspectives to facilitate a transi-
tion from the top-level identification of supply risks, and compilation of
critical material lists, towards the development of tangible strategies to
ensure secure mining-based supplies. Evidence gathered from 29
meetings with stakeholders (January 2014) at the outset of cross-sector
dialogue suggested that the business threats of material criticality in the
value chain are associated with the speed at which the supply chain can
respond to demand or supply shocks. Managing these threats depends
on: understanding the source of capacity risks affecting supply and
demand; the likelihood of capacity risks developing into disruption
events; and the possibilities for increasing the readiness of new capacity
throughout the supply chain. Supply-demand imbalances, usually
manifested as price volatility in the mineral commodities markets
(Buchholz et al., 2019; Renner and Wellmer, 2019), result as a com-
bination of capacity risks and disruption events. When this occurs, the
different stakeholders along the chain react according to their own
interests and capabilities (capacity readiness). Responses in the raw
materials sector that contribute to capacity readiness are usually
prioritised according to criteria such as: investment risks and economic
certainty/motivation; existing technological readiness; geological
knowledge and understanding of potential new deposits; research and
development capacity; and health and safety regulations. These vari-
ables determine the amount of time required to restore the balance in
the supply chain. For example, new and alternative types of ore deposits
may take decades to develop, from initial exploration to the design of
appropriate extraction and processing techniques, and subsequently to
mine development and production (Rademeyer et al., 2020). Long-term
access to raw materials is ensured but real or perceived (Renner and
Wellmer, 2019) short-term business risk is not mitigated. The stake-
holder dialogues highlighted that the potential solutions are com-
modity-specific, and considered metal and semi-metal production in
two groupings: the commodities that can be produced as by-products of
other main metals and the commodities that can be produced as the
primary output of mines. The workshop stakeholders considered that
addition of new by-product streams to operating mines is a potential
short-term solution, but that the addition of new processes in me-
tallurgical flowsheets can prove costly in terms of reagents and energy
consumption. Renner and Wellmer (2019) assert that, where by-pro-
duct extraction methods are in place, producers may react quickly to
market signals by increasing by-product recovery from the main mi-
neral when prices increase. If the stockmarket price is insufficient to
make processing economically viable, potential by-products are either
stockpiled or discarded as waste, with the potential for future extraction
(EC, 2015). For commodities produced by mining, small-deposit mining
is a potential alternative and short-term solution, where deposits are
proven and can be licenced rapidly, but will potentially fail to provide a
return on investment. Following the stakeholder dialogues, mining of
small deposits was scrutinised in greater detail.
Global mass flow analysis of tungsten, as a case study in critical raw
material production and consumption, shows that diverse end-use ap-
plications have not induced a geographically diverse raw materials
supply (Leal-ayala et al., 2015). This suggests that the climate of long-
term uncertainty and short-term supply-demand imbalances described
above must also be inextricably linked with external forces. Inequalities
in the demand-supply relationships are ultimately created by macro-
economics, international trade, foreign policy and the impact of social
change on technological innovation. The ‘Limits to Growth’ report
(Meadows et al., 1972) predicted the end-member scenarios that either
Fig. 3. Critical raw materials (red dots) are
important to the European economy, in terms
of end-use application and the value added to
corresponding EU manufacturing sectors, and
at risk of supply disruption from either global
producers or suppliers to the EU, considering
their governance performance and trade as-
pects. The risk-reducing measures of substitu-
tion and recycled are considered (EC, 2017).
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population and industrial capacity would suffer a sudden and un-
controlled decline, or that growth trends would be altered to promote a
sustainable ecological and environmental future. While the limits to
production of non-renewable, non-fossil fuel mineral resources have not
reached peak production (Oberle et al., 2019) and the global economy
remains dependant on sustained industrial growth, there is a growing
body of evidence that the environmental limits of industrial develop-
ment have been exceeded (Allwood, 2018; Barnosky et al., 2011;
Lenton et al., 2016). (Allwood, 2018) highlights that ‘techno-optimism’
for future innovation will not provide solutions to environmentally-
limited resource production and consumption across the value chain.
The United Nations Environmental Panel consider that mitigation of the
environmental impacts of industrialization, including mineral resource
production, in a short time-frame is possible using existing or feasible
technologies (Oberle et al., 2019).
Acemoglu et al., (2012) describe the current trend as a hybrid model
of directed technical growth and innovation with environmental con-
straints, which conforms to neither of the end-member models of un-
controlled decline or sustainable futures. Their growth model describes
exhaustible inputs as ‘dirty’ inputs and they suggest that sustainability
can be created by the use of taxes and subsidies to redirect innovation
towards ‘clean’ inputs. The rhetoric of dirty and clean inputs unin-
tentionally reflects the disconnection between production and con-
sumption in the wider consciousness. For example, perceptions of the
negative impacts of dirty mining (Harvey, 2014) by consumers are not
linked to the provision of clean energy with low-carbon emissions, even
Fig. 4. The geography of REE deposits and production. (a) Graph of size of REE deposits, in terms of tonnage and grade, as a function of location (by continent) and
simplified geological source characteristics. Only large and giant ore deposits are shown. (b) Interconnection between technological application of REE and inter-
national strategy regarding access to resources. (c) The effects of supply disruption on interest in investment in raw materials during the REE crisis of 2010–2012.
(Data and information from Cox and Kynicky, 2018; Klinger, 2015; Smith et al., 2016).
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though they are inextricably linked by the resources required to build
renewable energy infrastructures. It illustrates the need for greater
communication of the environmental and ethical frameworks within
which the mining industry has variably operated (Sidorenko et al.,
2020), and which have been recognised from a humanist perspective in
literature since Agricola's De re metallica (Hannaway, 1992). The ex-
ternal forces influencing the interconnected critical metal-based value
chain and technological development are embodied in social accep-
tance of mining. In can be argued that social acceptance is inextricably
entangled with the historical and environmental identity of mining to a
greater extent than it is with the provision of materials to the energy
transition for improved societal and ecological benefit.
3. The Geography of critical metal deposits
The onset of mine production at a new ‘world-class’ mine impacts
the global mining industry in a historically-established pattern. Where
the economies of scale are applied in a context with low labour costs
and permissive regulatory structures, the market is flooded with low
cost raw materials. Competitors that operate at a higher cost are ulti-
mately forced out of the market. A classic historic example is the es-
tablishment of multiple large tin mines in Asia and South America, in
the latter half of the 20th century. It led to the cessation of tin (and
tungsten) mining in England's southwest metallogenic province and
elsewhere in Europe even though mines were not exhausted. Exceptions
to this general pattern have arisen when trade networks have been
restricted by external influences, for example when military maritime
blockades impeded access to raw materials with lower production costs
during the world wars of the 20th century. Tungsten was strategically
important to the UK war effort (for armaments and tanks) and tungsten
was produced in SW England during both world wars, even though
mines were small and production was more expensive than from world-
class mines. The success of international trade and the lower cost of
international supplies in peacetime made the UK deposits sub-eco-
nomic, when tin and tungsten were shipped globally using the maritime
trade routes established largely as a function of imperial domination
(Dalby, 2008). Tungsten is once more of increasing strategic im-
portance, because: 1, it is used in an increased number of modern
technologies (Leal-ayala et al., 2015); 2, it has been subject to supply
concentration with > 70% (since 1994) and > 80% (consistently since
2010) of metal content produced in China (World Mineral Production
Statistics, BGS); and demand has been rapidly increasing in the 21st
century (Fig. 2). The Drakelands mine in SW England, which formerly
operated as the Hemerdon mine during and post-war, recently reopened
as a modern mine after decades of interest to prove a ‘world-class’ re-
serve and obtain appropriate permissions to operate. It operated for a
very brief period, despite extracting ore from the fourth largest tungsten
deposit in the world, because processing challenges lowered production
levels. The location of world-class mines therefore varies as a function
of the non-renewable nature of ore deposits, an enhanced under-
standing of the extent of orebodies and their potential for processing,
and due to the geographies of international trade and transport.
Geology controls the location and distribution of critical metal, and
other ore, deposits but economic, legislative and social factors control
which deposits are mined. The rare earth elements (REE) are the most
often cited and well-studied example of critical raw materials that have
been subject to recent supply disruption. The REE are up to two orders
of magnitude more rare in the continental crust than copper
(Chakhmouradian and Wall, 2012) but they are concentrated in large
magmatic, hydrothermal and sedimentary ore deposits (Elliott et al.,
2018; Smith et al., 2016). Ore deposits are located on all continents
including Europe (Goodenough et al., 2016) but only the Bayan Obo
REE deposit classifies as a giant ore deposit (Fig. 4a). Its production
statistics, combined with those of smaller deposits including ion ad-
sorption clays, show that China contributed less than 40% of global
REO supply prior to 1992. This increased to greater than 90% in 1998
and peaked at 98% of global REO production in 2009. The reasons for
the dominance of the Chinese REE raw materials sector in the global
market are largely the result of industrial and foreign policy that mark
the culmination of a long history of adverse international relations.
Klinger (2015) traced the historical and political geography of REE
production from 1880 to 1960, as a function of technological innova-
tion, foreign policy arising from military-industrial necessity and the
environmental hazards associated with production (Fig. 4b). The
Scandinavian placer deposits that supplied the first REE markets in the
1880s were quickly consumed. European nations initially looked to
their colonies for alternative resources and the German Foreign Min-
istry prospected in China through to the 1920s and 1930s. Subse-
quently, Britain and America developed a ‘joint effort to seek out and gain
control over as much of the world's uranium and thorium [also REE] de-
posits as possible’ in order to secure and dominate atomic arms devel-
opments (Klinger, 2015). Negotiations between the USA and China to
collaborate on geological exploration never reached fruition due to the
communist revolution of 1949, following which the Soviet Union and
China collaboratively developed REE alloys for the space and arms
races. The 1970s marked the transition between the atomic and digital
ages, when the significance of REE moved from small highly specialized
sectors to large-scale manufacturing of the technological hardware of
modern life. China had repelled invasive policies from foreign powers
and become technologically superior in the rare earths sector, im-
porting separated and refined rare earths, and dominating higher value
intermediate product manufacturing (Shen et al., 2019), specifically of
permanent magnets.
The established hierarchy of the capitalist world system in the 20th
century arose historically from imperial geopolitics (Dalby, 2008),
backed by extra-regional maritime dominance of key trade routes
(Brewster, 2017). However, 1951 marked the establishment of the
Baotou Iron and Steel complex as the industrial heartland of China and
the region from which the REE were produced. It is inextricably linked
with the evolution of China from an agrarian society into a landlocked
economic driver of industry (Cáceres and Ear, 2012). Recent signs of
economic stagnation in China due to overproduction and decreasing
returns to capital have incentivised the Chinese State to reconfigure its
geographic vision in order to continue its policy of economic expansion
(Zhang, 2017). Strategies designed to secure resources and business
objectives have significantly included the ‘Go Global’ strategy launched
in 1999 and the ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative announced in 2013. The
latter is premised on the resurrection of the Silk Road and the regional
maritime security of the Ming Dynasty (Brewster, 2017; Yoshihara and
Holmes, 2008; Zhang, 2017). The development of overland trade routes
has implications for the location of mining activity, particularly for high
value metals produced in small quantities. China has for several dec-
ades been a significant producer of multiple metals that are now de-
fined as critical raw materials (for example, tungsten and REE), and is
extending its reach to import raw materials from international mining
operations, particularly in Asia, Africa and Europe. China's global re-
sources acquisition raises geopolitical issues (Cáceres and Ear, 2012).
But it also constitutes opportunities in regions with new models of
political, economic and international development (Palit, 2017;
Power and Mohan, 2010), initially based on raw materials production
with low labour costs. While international trade by multi-national en-
terprises in China may seem to follow similar imperialistic, state-
sponsored patterns of development to European nations during the
Industrial Revolution, there are unique aspects (Peng, 2012) that sug-
gest care should be exercised before drawing parallels. The current
shifts in the geography of trade and raw materials supply can therefore
be framed as regionally-led change, rather than a revolutionary shift
(Schouenborg, 2012) in the geopolitical model.
Klinger (2015) asserts that the pursuit of mining opportunities be-
yond national borders is an effort to outsource environmental de-
gradation, as well as a strategy to preserve domestic reserves. This
implies that there is a tension between securing access to critical raw
K.R. Moore, et al. Resources, Conservation & Recycling: X 7 (2020) 100040
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materials and isolating the hazards generated by mining activities. The
REE are used as an example, in that their geological occurrence is often
coupled to that of the radioactive elements, particularly thorium and
uranium. Large amounts of REEs have been released to the environment
in the Baotou Province and other mining areas in China, with harmful
effects on local residents as well as the environment (Liang et al., 2014).
Environmental protest has grown, influencing national politics as a
result (Steinhardt and Wu, 2015). Klinger (2015) describes power as the
ability to ‘subject some and exempt others from the toxic and radioactive
by-products of mining and processing’, which suggests that environmental
disregard is an aggressive action towards other nations. Some mining
companies do not adhere to international norms for best practice in
responsible mining, which has the potential to create conflict in mining
regions, and potentially negative consequences for China's own eco-
nomic interests (Li, 2007). An increasing body of literature demon-
strates that best practice in responsible mining (for any commodity)
relating to environmental protection comes at a financial cost
(Humphreys, 2019b, 2000; Soderholm, 2000). Thus, environmental
negligence can contribute to price undercutting on global markets.
Foreign-owned extractive companies must adhere to national standards
of environmental protection, the extent of which is linked to govern-
ment services and responsibilities (McHenry et al., 2017). Poorer na-
tions may also have expectations of economic development based on
the extractive industries, fuelled by the interplay between resource
endowments and political manoeuvring (McElroy, 2015;
Robinson et al., 2006). In combination, these factors can result in in-
centives to encourage foreign investment in operations that do not
adhere to international norms for best mining practice. Thus, the out-
sourcing of environmental degradation is tied into economic develop-
ment, as well as constituting an abuse of power. Developed economies
have replaced raw materials production with business sectors further
along the value chain, and international business operations have been
established in efforts to maintain the low cost of raw materials relative
to the value chain.
The Covid-19 Pandemic has thrown into sharp relief the relation-
ships between national politics, international trade relations and the
value chain of critical raw materials. China introduced early mitigation
measures in response to the pandemic, which caused a significant re-
duction in demand in a large consumer market. The reduction in pur-
chase of US imports undermined the US-China trade deal (Lee, 2020).
Economic responses considered by the US included export controls,
investment curbs and ‘crackdowns on integrated supply chains’
(Politi et al., 2020). The EU and China intended to conclude an in-
vestment deal in 2020 (Valero, 2020), but this is now uncertain while
the duration and/or extent of economic recession is unknown and while
political relations between China and some member states are strained
(Rudd, cited by Ging, 2020). The dependence of European manu-
facturing on raw materials imports from China has influenced EU
strategy to develop European strategic and critical raw materials pro-
duction (EC, 2017, 2014). Steen (2020) contemplates whether the es-
tablished trend for direct investment in mining and processing by end-
product manufacturers may accelerate. If supply chains become in-
creasingly integrated outside of China, this could once more shift the
geographical patterns of raw materials production. It could potentially
improve traceability of responsibly-sourced raw materials (Young and
Dias, 2012), but negatively impact resource-dependant economies
(Zhuwarara, 2020).
4. Small Deposit mining and capital infrastructure
Small narrow-vein or complex ore bodies are recognised as having
potential for alternative raw materials production capacity (SIP, 2013).
They further provide excellent potential for rapid switch-on production,
particularly in response to short-term changes in market forces. How-
ever, what constitutes a ‘small deposit’ is not straightforwardly defined.
It cannot be defined in absolute dimensions because the metal content
is a function of grade and tonnage, and because the cut-off grade (of
what can be economically extracted) is influenced by the market price
of a commodity. For example, Fig. 4a demonstrates that REE deposits
may be considered large if they have orders of magnitude of between 10
MT ore at > 10 wt% RE2O3 or 1000 MT ore at > 0.1 wt% RE2O3.
Alternatively, Cassard et al., (2015) based the size of deposits on their
commodity content, which derives directly from grade and ore tonnage.
In order to understand how small a deposit can be and remain viable to
mine due to the economies of scale, the notion of ‘high-grade’ was
prioritized. The idea of high-grade is often linked to ‘small-scale’, and to
a certain point, complexity. Consultation within the Bureau de Re-
cherches Géologiques et Minières (BRGM) was used to establish
boundaries within which to discuss the notion of small, high-grade (and
sometimes complex) ore deposits for a small subset of critical and other
raw materials. The cut-off grades used for initial investigations of small
deposits were 1% for antimony (metal); 20% of chromium as Cr2O3;
0.1% of cobalt (metal); 3 g/t of gold; 5% of zinc or 10% lead-zinc
combined (metal). The BRGM established that a total of 201 known
mineral occurrences in the European Union satisfied the end-member
scenario of high grade and low tonnage alone, with no further de-
termination of economic viability. By establishing the criteria for de-
finition of a small deposit, the framework was created for improve-
ments to the EU-Minerals Knowledge Data Platform. The community of
end-users may now identify and locate small, high-grade complex de-
posits through selection functionalities in a dedicated data layer of
documented mineral occurrences. The results have highlighted mineral
deposits for further investigation but have also demonstrated the sig-
nificance of considering the critical raw materials alongside other raw
materials. The case study of zinc is interesting since it is a bulk metal
that has been extracted in recent decades by large-scale industrial
mining using economies of scale, but the large Lisheen mine in Ireland
closed in 2016. This has driven up the price of zinc and increased in-
terest in smaller deposits, which were formerly considered sub-eco-
nomic but may be economic in a higher value commodity scenario. It
confirms that methods to ensure rapid response to demand for critical
raw materials by small-deposit mining could be applied to commodities
other than critical raw materials. The potential for small-deposit mining
for any commodity is premised on the notion that it can compete eco-
nomically with production from mines in larger deposits. This requires
critical examination of the financial frameworks within which mining
operates.
Industry standard codes, such as the Australian JORC1 and Cana-
dian NI2 codes of mineral reporting, were developed in the late 20th
century to combat geological misreporting and subsequent losses on
public bourses. They codify best practice methodologies to prevent both
fraudulent and negligent misreporting of geological (and thus eco-
nomic) potential. Understandably these codes became the de-facto
measurement by which investors fund projects and banks provide
project finance3 for the high capital expenditure (CAPEX) and high
constant operating expenditure (OPEX) associated with large-scale
mining with low price elasticity (Buchholz et al., 2019). Throughout the
mining boom at the start of the 21st century adherence to these codes,
as well as the many additional responsibilities required by initiatives
such as the IFC's Equator Principles,4 became an absolute requirement
for public companies. The unintentional consequence of these extensive
1 JORC – The Australasian Core for Reporting of Exploration Results, Mineral
Resources and Ore Reserves.
2 NI 43-101 – The National Instrument for the Standards of Disclosure for
Mineral Projects within Canada.
3 Project Finance – The long term financing of infrastructure and industrial
projects based upon the projected cash-flows of the project rather than the
balance sheets of its sponsors.
4 Equator Principles - The International Finance Corporation's risk manage-
ment framework, adopted by financial institutions for determining, assessing
and managing environmental and social risks in projects.
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reporting codes was an exploration model where risk was held, not in
identifying an ore body, but rather finding one big enough to generate
the investor excitement required to fund compliance with the reporting
codes. Driven by the funding requirements of the mining stock markets
(particularly the Venture Exchanges5 in Canada, Australia and the
United Kingdom), the junior exploration companies were required, on
the whole, to identify ‘world class deposits’ at vast expense, in order to
realise the financial returns promised in their funding manifestos. The
capital required to fund the world-class mining operations resulted in
long payback periods and left the industry exposed to large financial
risk, much of which was written off leaving almost no investor desire to
fund exploration. This is classically demonstrated for the critical metals
during the REE crisis of 2010–2012 (Cox and Kynicky, 2018). Invest-
ment interest in the REE junior companies (Fig. 4c) was precipitated by
Chinese rare earth policies and World Trade Organization decisions,
media and government announcements, the initial public offering of
Molycorp Inc., rare earth element prices, and junior mining company
stock prices (Cox and Kynicky, 2018). REE prices peaked in 2011 and,
over two years, $4.2 billion was invested in 28 junior companies
(Fig. 4c), only two of which had the largest share and went on to
produce REE for the general market but not at great or lasting profit.
The investment community lost much of its interest in the REE by 2015
for multiple reasons, including the identification of new resources that
reduced the perceived risk of China's dominance (Cox and
Kynicky, 2018) and the lack of an adequate return.
It has become increasingly unrealistic for small- and medium-sized
mining companies to rely on traditional debt-equity financing to open
new projects following the global economic crisis (2008) and the more
recent commodities crash. Capital investment is now often sourced
from internal cash-flow and this phenomenon is forcing a change in the
way miners evaluate projects. The historically accepted norm of high
capital cost (>USD$100 Million), high fidelity orebody definition and
the associated feasibility studies, is no longer fit for purpose in the
emerging commodity market. Large, expensive resource drilling cam-
paigns and studies, required to achieve regulatory code compliance,
place a ‘capital threshold’ to access public market funding which is
prohibitive to all but the largest of mining companies. Hundreds of
junior companies have de-listed and many lesser tonnage deposits were
discounted as unfeasible even if they were closer to the end-user market
or located in more stable mining jurisdictions. This constrains the
production market and increases the real or perceived supply risk of
critical raw materials. The longer the current model continues to be
used, the higher the risk to global resource security; with little new
exploration, depleting reserves and increased market fragility. Small to
mid-tier miners and mine developers are now increasingly looking for a
different development funding model based on the potential to quickly
establish the minimum economic ore reserves required to commit to
start a small-scale mining and processing operation.
The new reality is that exploration needs to identify, in the first
instance, the minimum economically viable ore deposit required to
justify start-up. Industry needs a model where, for the minimum capital
expenditure, cash can be generated to fund further exploration or to
simply mine out a small ore body. If sufficient deposits are identified
(noting that exploration of this kind is more likely to ‘follow’ the mi-
neralization than commit to thousands of metres of core drilling) then
the cash generated by the initial operation will be used to upscale the
operation or fund further resource definition exploration. In this pro-
posed model, geographically-dislocated small-deposits (of <500,000t
for example) could be operated in a managed portfolio (Njike and
Kumral, 2019) as a ‘deposit-cluster’, facilitating the regeneration of a
whole region. The traditional model for such clusters would be trucking
of mined ore to a central processing plant; this is often neither logisti-
cally feasible (due to terrain), economically viable (due to ore grades,
distances or prices) or socio-environmentally desirable (due to high-
impact traffic). In the future the small, high-grade but often narrow-
veined or chemically complex deposits that are present across Europe
(and in other regions) must be made viable. Technological mining so-
lutions already exist in principal, which include modular processing
equipment that can be deployed without substantial infrastructure de-
velopment costs and innovative waste disposal solutions, although their
application in short-duration mining of small, high-grade and complex
deposits needs further consideration.
It is the general case that exploitation of small deposits has been
limited since financial institutions are attracted to larger projects of-
fering considerable arrangement fees and the promise of substantial,
long-term interest repayments. However, in recent years the mining
sector has come to recognise that risk is not entirely proportional to the
scale of mining operations. Small deposits are amenable to small-scale
mining operations and, in response to market forces, small-scale mining
in larger deposits also provides significant opportunities (Quirke et al.,
2019). The implication is that small-scale mining may apply to both
small deposits and large deposits, as well as to both critical raw ma-
terials and bulk metals. The mining industry, operating at all scales
(Sidorenko et al., 2020) and for nearly all commodities, is now facing
unprecedented challenges due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Due to re-
duced demand, bulk metal prices fell by 10–15% between 4 March and
2 April 2020 and the price of the critical metals platinum and palladium
fell 40% in a comparable time period (Laing, 2020; Ahmed, 2020). The
concomitant fall in share prices was comparable to that of the financial
crash of 2008–2009 (Laing, 2020). It is likely that multiple mining
operations will become sub-economic, particularly where additional
capital costs are required to re-open mine sites. Small deposit mining by
small-scale operations may become more attractive in a post-pandemic
context, due to the lower investment required, in a market of low
prices, low production and potential over-supply.
5. Environmental And social narratives as drivers of ethical
mining solutions
Extraction from only world-class mines imposes fragility upon both
the global market and local economies. Mining operations generally
have large socio-economic, sometimes political and environmental
impacts, both positive and negative. Over the next 100 years, an in-
tensifying demand for mineral resources and the exploitation of lower
commodity grade ores will lead to the doubling of current annual global
waste volumes and the disposal of an additional 2000 km3 of solid mine
wastes (Lottermoser, 2010). Mining and production of metals causes
the dispersion of metals and metalloids (Martínez López et al., 2008) as
well as health hazards. The centralisation of large-scale mining activ-
ities in few geographical locations concentrates heavy machinery and
traffic within a single geographic location and requires vast transport
networks that result in a globally high environmental impact. In re-
sponse, the International Maritime Organization has capped sulphur
limits in maritime fuel at 0.5%, effective from 2020 (Terazono and
Hume, 2017). Dramatic increases in the cost of shipping are expected
(Raval at al., 2019) and, coupled with the energy requirements of
crushing vast quantities of low-grade ore, the price of metals from a
dominant global supplier is likely to rise. Should the environmental cost
of managing wastes and preventing tailings dam failures also be in-
cluded in the price of commodities (Garcia et al., 2017), then en-
vironmental factors increase the economic feasibility of developing
local or regional supplies from small, high-grade deposits that are se-
lectively mined for lower waste production per unit cost.
Modern mining operations in the small deposits of historic mining
districts will likely encounter the waste of former mining activities.
Such legacy wastes were created outside of modern frameworks for
responsible mining practice and, depending on the type of ore deposit,
5 Venture Exchanges – stock markets established as liquid secondary markets
for small and medium sized companies. Examples of which as the ‘TSX’ in
Canada and London's AIM market.
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can continue to release deleterious elements into the environment. For
example, specific waste dumps at former sites of extraction in Italy pose
a carcinogenic risk due to the presence of arsenic and a risk to
groundwater due to the presence of nickel (Antonella et al., 2020,
2018). The recovery of critical and other raw materials from extractive
waste is not a widespread practice, even where it is technologically
feasible, economically viable and of environmental benefit (EC, 2019;
Mehta et al., 2020; Nevskaya et al., 2020). However, environmental
and social licenses to operate may be predicated on the removal of pre-
existing contamination, since specific requirements exist for both the
minimisation and the recovery of extractive waste (EC, 2015, 2006).
Extractive wastes are considerable in mines that remove few com-
modities, and only above cut-off grades, due to the poor economic re-
turns from additional and costly processing streams. Inclusion of legacy
waste treatment in Environmental and Social Governance (ESG) may
improve the business case for secondary raw material production as
part of the environmental cost of mining (Armstrong et al., 2019b,
2019a; Humphreys, 2019b). Selective mining in small deposits should
produce lower waste per unit cost than mining of high volumes of low
grade ore at world-class mines. However, the overall return on invest-
ment is smaller than for large-scale mining: environmental costs will
constitute a larger proportion of unit costs, particularly where mining of
small deposits is of short duration and requires that both historical and
contemporaneous wastes be managed. The need to include the en-
vironmental cost of mining in economic planning is acute for mining of
small deposits.
The ‘Geoethical Promise’ of the International Association for the
Promotion of Geoethics places the interest of society foremost and re-
quires the protection of the Earth system. It echoes the European
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which states that the principles of good
Ethical practice include the primacy of the interest and welfare of the
human being. Since the welfare of the individual (whether human or
otherwise) is affected by the community and the environment in which
it lives, the objectives of a population may vary as environmental cir-
cumstances change (Mayr, 2000) and the environmental and social
aspects of resource extraction are inextricably intertwined. Sociological
ethical considerations in mining were not the driving force behind the
emergence of social licencing, which instead originated as an industry
response to opposition and a mechanism to ensure the viability of the
sector (Owen and Kemp, 2013). There are no international treaties to
control comprehensively and effectively the social and environmental
impacts of mining and the advancement of responsible mining has
therefore rested essentially on national and sub-national regulation and
the business sector. At a very general level, social license can be defined
as expectations and demands on a business enterprise that have
emerged from neighbourhoods, environmental groups, community
members, and other elements of the civil society surrounding the en-
terprise (Raval et al., 2019). It stands to reason that social licensing falls
short of the real need to implement ethical considerations in mining
because opinions as to what constitutes an ethical approach are influ-
enced by individual value systems and governance factors. Ethical ap-
proaches of individuals are a function of education and training, pro-
fessional codes and relations, and the metrics of the society in which
mining is practised (Caldwell, 2006; Lu et al., 2017; Owen and
Kemp, 2013; Siegel, 2013). A workshop of stakeholders drawn from the
mining industry, NGOs, academia, social practitioners and ethicists
examined the question of whether a set of actions devised to gain social
acceptance was also a set of actions based on the ethical protection of
the rights of the individual, and how this might apply to small deposit
mining. The group considered that ethical mining is responsible mining
but that it might require a reconsideration of the business model for
small deposit mining, as a function of truncated life of mine. The speed
at which mining proceeds and the small size of deposit requires the
most rigorous environmental protection to mitigate the negative im-
pacts of mine closure. Moreover, the economic benefits of rapid ex-
traction may not be socially practicable, where community gain in
terms of employment and satellite business development are rapidly
withdrawn. Small deposit mining may require a new relationship be-
tween mining and society.
An argument that ethical mining establishes limits on extraction,
once the grade is diminished in large deposits (Priester et al., 2019;
Siegel, 2013), is automatically applied to small high-grade deposits
since the latter cannot operate on economies of scale. Communities are
less likely to become economically over-dependant on mining of small
deposits than on long-term mining operations (Tserkezis and
Tsakanikas, 2016). Economic benefits based on supply chains
(Xing et al., 2017) are unlikely to become well established, or perhaps
even to persist following closure of a mine in a small deposit that is not
part of a regional cluster of mines. Innovative approaches to Corporate
Social Responsibility must therefore be considered. It is unclear as to
whether either a smaller mining operation close to a community, or a
clear delineation between mining corporations, local communities and
governments or policy-makers will confer greater trust (Harvey, 2014;
Hill and Lillywhite, 2015). More work needs to be done therefore to
bring these disparate groups, with different priorities and agendas,
closer together in order to realise the future of mining as en-
vironmentally and socially accountable. There is a movement towards
establishing the societal and environmental implications of im-
plementing small-scale mining in a European context (Sidorenko et al.,
2020) as the underpinning of policy recommendations. But further
steps must be taken to facilitate sustainable small deposit mining,
perhaps by encouraging a greater number of mining companies to adopt
a business model of co-creation with an emphasis on ethical responsi-
bility. This signals a critical shift for the present, while also establishing
a lasting economic, environmental and social legacy of mining com-
panies. As just one constituent in mixed and often diverse local and
regional economies, small-scale mining operations offer a significant
benefit to local communities, not least in building the grounds for
economic resilience when mines close. It should be incumbent upon
mining companies undertaking small-scale mining to include creation
of diverse economic opportunities in their social investment portfolio to
mutual economic benefit.
6. Circular Narratives in the history of mining innovation
There remains a great deal to be done to fully realise the range of
benefits offered by small-deposit mining regimes in nations where high-
CAPEX, large-scale mining dominates. In order to achieve the transition
called for here, it is essential that we reveal the ways in which historical
and ideological frameworks shape current understandings and re-
presentations of mining, and industrial and technological change more
widely. In doing so, this section offers an alternative approach to the
future of mining in the twenty-first century, by examining the ways in
which historical narratives can be usefully employed to inform current
attitudes and perceptions.
The significant contribution of History (and humanities more
widely) concerns the ways in which we choose to narrate the past,
present and future of mining. The large-scale, high-tech, high-invest-
ment, high-returns business model is driven by a particular ideological
agenda, embedded in a capitalist model of continued progress and
growth - the threads of which can be traced back to the eighteenth
century in British elite culture (and even further back in Asia).
Narratives of industrial revolution construct a progressive account of
technological innovation, efficiency and growth. Indeed, as debated by
the World Economic Forum, some commentators have suggested that
we are currently in the midst of a fourth industrial revolution, which
promises a range of benefits to global economies and societies
(Humphreys, 2019a; Prisecaru, 2016). In Prisecaru's synopsis the first
industrial revolution started with the invention of the steam engine, a
technological advance that allowed the transition from feudal to capi-
talist society. He goes on to summarise that each revolution, including
the transition to a post-industrial society today, was related to specific
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Fig. 5. Trends in production of iron ore from the 12th to 21st century as a function of European consumption (a), source of energy (b), international economic (and
political/military) strategies for production (c), the scale of international mining and processing (d), description of industrial revolutions for economic forecasting of
sectoral trends (e). Compiled using data from Boserup, 1981; Nakajima et al., 2018; Prisecaru, 2016; Wagner, 1995; the World Mineral Statistics database of the
British Geological Survey and online statistics of the United Stated Geological Survey.
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energy resources, and technical innovations that stimulated economic
growth in response to humanitarian issues and decreased prosperity
(Prisecaru, 2016). Prisecaru adopts a post-humanist philosophy,
whereby resource efficiency and technologies release society from
physical labour, but he neglects consideration of the value chain as it
relates to raw materials.
Fig. 5 demonstrates the interplay between energy resources, in-
vestment, innovation and scale of production using iron ore as an ex-
ample. Iron ore is now produced in greater abundance than any other
metallic raw material (Fig. 2), but it was a critical raw material pro-
duced in proximity to markets throughout the Middle Ages. Sig-
nificantly, the concept of vertical integration of the value chain was a
theme in Medieval manufactories of Europe and in areas of China up to
the 19th century that were isolated from trade routes (Boserup, 1981;
Wagner, 1995; Fig. 5a, c, d). Efficient, cost-competitive and capital-
intensive production methods that operated using the economies of
scale were discontinued in China due to the combined effects of a 19th
century national downturn, foreign competition, and alternative in-
vestment opportunities (Wagner, 1995). In contrast, skills and low-ca-
pital production methods were retained for local production and
manufacturing, where technological inefficiency was balanced by low
labour costs and the high transport costs of importation. In Europe, the
location of mining changed as a function of energy provision
(Boserup, 1981) and mining adapted to capitalise on new forms of
energy (Fig. 5 a-c). The intertwined relationship between mining for
raw materials and energy requirements was as instrumental in driving
mining innovation (e.g. water-power, the steam engine, ventilation,
smelting), as it is today for renewable energy.
In the context of historical research, the innovations that have been
described as ‘revolutionary’ (Prisecaru, 2016) emerged incrementally
over time (Fig. 5, d-e), and were often complex, contingent and con-
tested. Historians (e.g. O'Brien, 2017) have been at pains to show that
there is no straightforward, linear account of industrial change over
time. Placed on a chronological timeline, punctuated by a sequence of
historical precedents, the notion of revolution offers an optimistic vi-
sion of a future in which technological change is imagined to signal a
new, improved and progressive human epoch. Commenting on the late
eighteenth and nineteenth century, Jonsson (2012) argues ‘the unin-
tended consequences of the Industrial Revolution challenge deep-seated as-
sumptions about technology, the environment and economic growth’. In his
words, ‘historians can no longer treat the environment as merely a pool of
resources at the disposal of Promethean technology’. Commenting on en-
ergy and the industrial revolution, historian Tony Wrigley (2013) la-
ments the discourse of abundance and plenty, infinite progress and
economic growth achieved through the unchecked exploitation of fossil
fuels. Humanity stands at the edge of a precipice, he writes, having
arrived at this junction by the consequences of continuing to release
carbon into the atmosphere at an exponential rate. The narrative that
linear patterns of progress and growth cannot go on into the future is
reinforced when we consider the multiplicity of possible environmental
tipping points, particularly those that relate to energy fluxes, and the
economies of scale in mining (Humphreys, 2019a; Lenton, 2013;
Lenton et al., 2016).
In Patrick O'Brien's (2006) words the industrial revolution was
forged though ruthless forces “conquest, internal colonization, the violent
expropriation of ecclesiastical and common land, and the systematic accu-
mulation of power by closed aristocratic elites”. It is not a term to be used
lightly therefore. Calling upon homogenised accounts of any so-called
‘revolution’ as an identifiable and measurable event is further pro-
blematized when we consider the international context. Historians have
shown the inadequacy of giving precedence to the British model of
industrial revolution (as summarized by O'Brien, 2017). Across time
and space, change occurred at different times in different places and
often as an outcome of very different contexts and circumstances. When
examined in global perspective, historians have persuasively argued
that there was no one neat model of change; rather the history of
industrial and technological change splinters both geographically and
socially. This is mirrored in analyses of global trends and systems in
order to identify intervention points. Rather than considering techno-
logical innovation as progressive and ‘revolutionary’, Steffen et al.,
(2015) describe the ‘Great Acceleration’ as a growth/collapse economic
pattern accompanied by global inequity. The authors postulate that the
approaching stabilization of global population and leapfrogging adop-
tion of low impact technologies in the developing world may pave the
way to decoupling development from negative environmental impacts.
This objective would be accelerated if leapfrogging included adoption
of practices to identify and encourage virtuous tipping points in human
systems (Lenton, 2013). The implication is that economic and en-
vironmental trends are likely to be disrupted by actions in the devel-
oping world, which dominates global growth. In these nations, small-
scale and/or artisanal mining remains a very significant part of mixed
economies (Hilson and McQuilken, 2014), and can form a social and
economic practise that safeguards both environments and communities.
Step changes in mining or mining paradigms, as they learn from
historical or artisanal mining of small high-grade deposits, should
therefore be phrased in the context of circular or entangled narratives,
rather than historical assumptions based on linear, revolutionary
change and ever-greater technological progress. The alternative circular
model takes on board continuities – social, cultural, environmental - as
well as identifying moments of change. It takes on board the lessons of
history that illustrate the environmental and social degeneration of
landscapes and communities in past (and present) mining regions.
Continuing to reproduce narrative frameworks of unrelenting progress
and technological advances, while overlooking socio-environmental
orientated strategies for sustainability and resilience, is clearly open to
critical question. As argued here, an understanding of historical pro-
cesses of change as contingent and non-linear opens up new frame-
works for thinking about the present and future development of mining.
Rather than viewing the past as redundant, an outmoded yesteryear,
the circular and entangled model places micro-level knowledge systems
and societal needs and practices originating from within local com-
munities at the foreground of a new mining ethics and sustainable
policy. It is only by taking seriously our responsibilities towards in-
dividuals and communities, and the environments in which they live
and work, that the right decisions can be made in producing future
mining solutions with sustainability at their core. By investing in highly
specific technological innovations to extract minerals on a small-scale,
we can begin to ensure the least amount of damage to local environ-
ments, while also supporting resident communities beyond the life-span
of the mines. By thinking critically about the ways mainstream history
is written from a particular ideological perspective it becomes possible
to rethink the present and indeed lasting legacy of mining into the fu-
ture.
We are not arguing for the uncritical re-generation of historical
small-deposit mining practices, but rather that lessons from larger
mining operations must be applied in the design of current approaches,
taking on board local knowledge and needs. For example, technological
innovation in bringing automation to large mines has resulted in the
capacity to extract minerals from low-grade ores that would not be cost
effective under a manual labour regime. And the three common reasons
for the failure of mining operations - overly optimistic mine design and
scheduling; resource and reserve estimation that is too local or site
specific; and inadequate metallurgical test work and sampling that re-
sults in scale-up problems (McCarthy, 2003) – will continue to apply.
Yet paradoxically, automation has not resulted in a secure supply of
specialist raw materials, and escalation of waste and environmental
degradation detract from economic gains. Thus, revolutionary claims
that emerging technologies will produce positive outcomes are in
danger of bordering on hype (Simakova and Coenen, 2013), unless
placed into a sustainable context. If technical challenges can be over-
come, rapid start-up and mine closure can then only be achieved re-
sponsibly where mining operations are environmentally and socially
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acceptable within an agreed ethical framework. A major change in
mining trends would include some of the characteristics of conven-
tional, historic and artisanal mining practices combined with in-
novative modern mining methods with lower infrastructure costs.
Taken together, this integrated approach has the potential to alleviate
the market fragility of critical raw materials and to reduce the negative
socio-environmental per site impacts of mining. Thus, the approach will
support the United Nations drive towards partial or total decoupling of
economic growth activities from negative impacts on society and en-
vironment (Oberle et al., 2019).
7. The Future of mining
The proponents of ‘revolutionary’ change employ an established, yet
overly simplistic, argument for technological solutions, supplied by
abundant raw materials that will drive societal and economic growth. A
more sophisticated analysis moves away from simply tracking the pace
and scale of technological innovation over time, by exploring instead
the entanglements of social and technological relationships across time
and space. History sheds light on human interactions, on the extent and
limits of cooperation, and a time-deepened understanding of social and
environmental entanglements. Moreover, technological developments
do not emerge in a vacuum: situated knowledge and practices, and
decision-making are based on past antecedents that encompass eco-
nomic considerations but also a raft of intersecting social, cultural,
political, governmental opportunities and constraints. Over the course
of the last two hundred or so years, alternative models based on small-
scale processes of extraction, increasingly failed to fit the prescribed
capitalist agenda. This disconnection constitutes a fundamental issue
for the proponents of alternative models of mining, including the mixed
economies of artisanal mining communities. It is important therefore to
consider rewriting the story of progress and change as one of ethical
responsibility, social respectability and environmental care. This re-
quires us to be more discerning about referring to historical models like
‘industrial revolution’ and its historical precedents. We are suggesting
neither revolutionary change nor a return to past modes of mining, but
instead to think through the past in order to facilitate the emergence of
a sustainable small-deposit mining framework for the future.
The diversity of raw materials required for manufacturing of
modern technologies requires a diverse set of mining solutions.
Technological innovation for a global low-carbon economy requires
raw materials with specialist properties that cannot all be produced
securely and sustainably using automated low cost per unit production
from world class and giant ore deposits. In addition, Europe is facing
the fact that it has been largely mined out of world-class deposits,
compared to the “big” mining nations. The authors believe that the
future of the mining industry in Europe will be increasingly dominated
by small to medium, often privately owned companies, possibly aug-
mented by community-led consortiums. These operators and the pro-
jects they champion, will not be of the scale required to attract tradi-
tional finance models following the 2008 financial crisis. Going forward
both exploration and exploitation will be funded from internal cash-
flow, generated by a company's operating assets. There are very few
companies with sufficient surplus cash and strong enough balance
sheets to commission the model of high throughput mining and pro-
cessing plants that a debt financed major (or state-subsidised entity)
will look to deploy. Until a low-cost, low-impact, sustainable alternative
can be developed, the potential to fully unlock the mineral reserves of
Europe and elsewhere will not be realised. Technology will play a huge
part in this evolution in mining affairs, but mining code and practices
will also need to be revised to fit such small and mobile operations. The
traditionally held conviction of scale has to be debunked and many of
the recently presumed assumptions about feasibility and geological
certainty re-evaluated in order to develop a set of different mining so-
lutions appropriate to the increasing array of raw materials required by
modern society.
Governing bodies have recognised the need to accelerate innovation
to increase security of supply of raw materials. The European
Innovation Partnership (EIP) on Raw Materials identified a Priority
Area for research and innovation entitled ‘Technologies for primary and
secondary raw materials production’. The description of the Priority
Area articulated that technological challenges along the entire raw
materials value chain need to be addressed by production solutions that
avoid environmental damage and engage society. Specifically the
Commission solicited research on the development of new sustainable
selective low impact technological solutions for mining of small mineral
deposits on the land. Collaborative research is underway, based on the
following characteristics of a new mining paradigm:
1. Material criticality can be reduced by increasing the capacity
readiness of the supply system. An increase in the rate of response of
raw material supply to market forces can be achieved by facilitating
access to multiple small deposits in Europe.
2. The extant model of high cost orebody definition and pre-feasibility
studies can only be supported by very large mineral deposits. Such
deposits are increasingly low grade and require constant technolo-
gical optimization to remain economic. The current mining para-
digm cannot facilitate exploitation of small high-grade deposits. A
new mining paradigm is needed.
3. High population densities, sensitive environmental conditions and
multiple land uses require that mining produce minimal waste,
consume minimal energy and provide maximum benefit to local
communities. Mining solutions for small high-grade deposits should
therefore include reduced throughput of material by selective
mining, mine plans with an appropriate workforce model, and an
ethical relationship with community.
Although catalysed by concerns over access to critical raw mate-
rials, the re-emergence of small deposit mining is set to become an
important part of a diverse raw materials production sector for multiple
commodities as prices increase in response to energy demands and
transport costs. Historicity demonstrates that the emerging iteration in
the circular narrative of mining evolution borrows from ancient and
artisanal practices of following high-grade ore materials at minimal
cost, but mining is now fundamentally reinvented for environmental
and societal best practice. This is particularly important to help resolve
economic land-use conflicts and to unlock resources in densely popu-
lated or sensitive areas. The relevance of small-deposit mining by small-
scale operations to global supply may be heightened as industry
emerges from the Covid-19 pandemic. There is uncertainty around the
duration and location of supply shocks due to the pandemic, such that
existing supply chains may be challenged. There is uncertainty around
the duration of reduced demand, potentially creating oversupply. Price
volatility ensues in either case, such that mining operating at lower cost
(both CAPEX and OPEX) may be an attractive option.
8. Conclusions
The task outlined at the start of the manuscript was to examine the
paradigm of small-deposit mining using historical and contemporary
narratives, case study and stakeholder perspectives. Mining of small
deposits was considered as separate from the concept of small-scale
mining (Sidorenko et al., 2020), since the former transects historical
and contemporary narratives and the latter has multiple modern con-
texts. In so doing, we intended that the frameworks and criteria be
established that will enable further discourses.
We outlined, in multi-disciplinary framings, the long-term trends of:
(i) an increasing and larger resource base that is needed by society; (ii)
shifting patterns of resource supply and consumption as a function of
multiple global externalities (political, economic and societal); (iii) the
environmental limits that are now exceeded by our industrialized so-
ciety. We considered the impact of short-term criticality due to real or
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perceived supply-demand imbalances, including the impacts of conflict
or the Covid-19 pandemic. We placed historical perspectives on mining,
innovation and industrialisation in the context of sustainable global
development and the mineral-energy nexus for the low-carbon
economy.
The narratives of past, present and future mining highlight that
existing and feasible technologies for selective mining of small-deposits
can have smaller and shorter duration impacts (both positive and ne-
gative) than large-scale mining of low-grade ores. Thus, the expansion
of mining in small deposits will require a new relationship with society,
acknowledging that the legacies of historic mining activities influence
societal perceptions of modern mining. Opportunities exist to consider
mining of small deposits as part of locally-diversified economies and
remediated environments, as well as responsive to global volatility in
metal markets. Mining of small deposits will require less investment
and may offset risk for mining practitioners and investors, but it will
require a reinvestigation of current reporting and finance models.
International trade relations, foreign policy and the geography of value
chains may limit the potential for geographically-dispersed mining of
small deposits. However, increasing global demands for best practice,
equitable distribution of opportunities and reduction of carbon emis-
sions now coincide with initiatives to support the circular economy as
well as potentially greater short-term supply-demand imbalances. In
combination, these external forces may create a climate that is amen-
able to the expansion of mining of small deposits.
We conclude that the wide range of raw materials for modern
technologies require a diversified set of mining solutions that can use-
fully include selective mining of small deposits, if it can be decoupled
from the negative impacts of historic mining practices. There is a
pressing need for empirical data on the extent of small deposits, to
underpin development of the socio-economic frameworks that could
facilitate a more diverse portfolio of future mining solutions.
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